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THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS &
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE FORUM
NON CONVENIENS DOCTRINE
BY FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN
1
This article addresses the forum non conveniens [FNC] doc-
trine within the context of international human rights and ethics.
First, this article will examine the availability and adequacy of
using international tribunals for circumventing the FNC doctrine
in national courts for plaintiffs claiming human rights violations,
as well as the possible emergence of an international FNC doc-
trine for regional international tribunals.' Although the main
focus is on the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights, this article also discusses the European Court of Human
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Second, the article
will address the FNC doctrine in relation to the Alien Tort Claims
Act' litigation in U.S. courts addressing human rights violations.
Finally, this article will briefly address ethical dimensions of the
FNC doctrine.
1. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS & THE
FNC DOCTRINE
Some background on the availability and adequacy of interna-
tional tribunals for litigating human rights claims is necessary to
fully understand the subject matter of this article. Over fifteen
years ago, international human rights law was not taken very
seriously. It was considered to be "soft law". However, over the
1. President, Rights International, The Center for International Human Rights
Law, Inc.; fmr. Ariel F. Sallows Professor of Human Rights, University of
Saskatchewan College of Law.
2. In determining whether a case should be transferred to another forum, the
FNC doctrine examines whether an alternative forum is both (i) accessible and (ii)
adequate. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-507 (1947). If the alternative forum is accessible
and adequate, the court must then balance a series of factors involving the private
interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in the competing forum and any
public interests at stake. See, e.g., Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09. The defendant has the
burden to establish that an adequate alternative forum exists and then to show that
the pertinent factors "tilt[ I strongly in favor of trial in the foreign forum." R.
Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). "The plaintiffs
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
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years, there have been dozens of cases before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights4 and thousands of cases in which the
European Court of Human Rights' have found states in violation
of their international legal obligations with respect to human
rights. Of those many rulings, only a few states have refused or
been slow to comply with these Courts' orders." There is little
doubt that now international human rights law is "hard law," i.e.,
effective law. Therefore, international human rights fora gener-
ally are both available and adequate. However, there are some
twists and turns in this general conclusion that depend upon the
particular tribunal and the kind of remedy sought.
1.1. AVAILABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TRIBUNALS
There are two major international adjudicative systems that
deal with human rights: the Inter-American Commission and
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights.7 Both of these courts will be discussed in detail in the
upcoming sections.
1.1.1. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION & COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
In relation to the Inter-American system, individuals can sue
any member of the Organization of American States [OAS] before
the Inter-American Commission ["the Commission"] for violations
of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.8
4. For a list of cases addressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
see http'/www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/index-seriec-ing.html (last visited June 24,
2003).
5. Between November 1, 2002 and February 28, 2003 alone, the European Court
of Human Rights dealt with 7031 cases. Council of Europe, European Court of Human
Rights, Human Rights Information Bulletin No. 58, Nov. 2002 - Feb. 2003 at 2.
6. For state-party compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights,
see Christian Tomuschat, Quo Vadis, Argentoratum? The Success Story of the
European Convention on Human Rights - and a Few Dark Stains, 13 Hum. RTS. L. J.
401 (1992). For state-party compliance with the American Convention on Human
Rights, see ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
available at http://corteidh.or.cr/publicaciones-ing/index.html (last visited June 24,
2003).
7. The Inter-American Commission is located in Washington, D.C., and the Inter-
American Court is located in San Jose, Costa Rica. The European Court of Human
Rights is located in Strasbourg, France.
8. OAS Res. XX, 2 May 1948, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 at 17
(1992) [hereinafter American Declaration).
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The United States is an OAS member. However, individuals can-
not sue those OAS member states before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights if they are not states-parties to the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights [ACHR]. 9 Furthermore, only
those states that recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court can be sued." Although states such as Honduras, Vene-
zuela, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Haiti, Chile, and Argentina are
parties to the ACHR, other states, such as the U.S. and Cuba, are
not states-parties." Therefore, non-states-parties cannot be sued
under the ACHR before the Inter-American Court.
It is important to recognize that private individuals or corpo-
rations cannot be sued under this system.12 However, it may be
possible for a state to be sued in place of such private persons or
corporations if the state failed to exercise due diligence in prevent-
ing certain gross human rights violations, such as murder or tor-
ture, or participated in such violations. 13 Furthermore, while
corporations can sue under this system, individual shareholders
within the corporation cannot. 4 Unlike the Commission, which
can only provide declaratory relief, 5 the Inter-American Court
provides monetary damages, injunctive relief, legal fees, and costs
awards. 6 However, the Inter-American Court has not provided
relief in the form of punitive damages.
In order to have a have a case admitted to the Inter-American
system, the petition must first be submitted to the Inter-American
9. American Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 (entered into force July 17, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR].
10. ACHR, supra note 9, art. 62.
11. FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW &
PRACTICE: CASES, TREATIES AND MATERIALS (DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT), Xi1-Xvii
(1997) (library edition).
12. ACHR, supra note 9, art. 44.
13. See, e.g., Velisquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4, at 135 (state liable for failing to fulfill affirmative duty to prevent right to life,
humane treatment, and liberty violations committed by private or state actor).
14. Banco de Lima Shareholders v. Peru, Report No. 10/91, Case No. 10.169,
INTER-AM. C.H.R. 1990-1991, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79, doc. 12 rev. 1 at 425-426 (1991);
MARTIN, supra note 11, at 1094.
15. See Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10 at §§ 40-47
(Inter-American Commission charged with duty to promote observance and defense of
OAS members' obligations in American Declaration).
16. ACHR, supra note 9, art. 63 (injunctive and compensatory relief); Sud.rez
Rosero v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 44 (1999) (legal fees and costs
award granted).
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Commission.17 For the Commission to find the case admissible, the
case may not be pending in another international proceeding, the
petitioners must have exhausted any and all domestic remedies,
and the case generally must be filed within six months of exhaust-
ing these remedies. If the Commission finds the case admissible,
the Commission then examines the merits of the case. If the Com-
mission finds a violation of the American Declaration, the Com-
mission eventually issues a report on its findings. If the OAS
member is also a party to the American Convention and the Com-
mission finds the member in violation of the Convention, the Com-
mission may - or may not - refer the case to the Inter-American
Court."s
1.1.2. EUROPEAN COURT OF HuMAN RIGHTS
In the European Court of Human Rights, individuals can sue
states-parties to the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR].1' Just about every western and
eastern European State (including Russia) is a state-party to the
European Convention. As in the Inter-American system, private
individuals and corporations cannot be sued. States, however, can
be sued for failure to prevent foreseeable gross human rights vio-
lations committed by private persons.° Furthermore, corporations
can - and often do - sue states-parties. 1 Only in dicta has the
European Court recognized that shareholders can sue in excep-
tional circumstances.22 The European Court provides monetary
damages, legal fees and costs awards; 23 however, it does not pro-
vide injunctive relief and has not provided punitive damages.
As with the Inter-American system, petitioners (called "appli-
cants") in the European Court of Human Rights are not permitted
to have the case pending in another international proceeding,
17. ACHR, supra note 9, arts. 46-47.
18. A case flow chart for the Inter-American system can be found in MARTn,
supra note 11, at 1059 (DocUMENTARY Supp. ).
19. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 34, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter ECHRI.
20. Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (2000) (affirmative state
duty to prevent foreseeable right to life violations committed by private actor); A. v.
United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1999) (affirmative state duty to prevent
foreseeable right to humane treatment violations committed by private actor).
21. See, e.g., Gasus Dosier-und Fordertechnik GmbH v. The Netherlands, 306-B
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995).
22. Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995).
23. ECHR, supra note 19, art. 50.
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must exhaust all domestic remedies, and generally must file
within six months of exhausting these remedies.24
As this brief outline of the procedural law and institutional
aspects of the Inter-American and European systems illustrates,
the doctrine of forum non conveniens is somewhat moot. After all,
these tribunals sit in only one location, forcing both the petitioners
and the states to litigate the case in same place.
1.2. ADEQUACY OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The next phase of analysis involves the adequacy of these
international tribunal systems. As previously mentioned, the
Inter-American Commission does not award damages; nor does it
provide for legal fees and costs. Compared to the Inter-American
and European Courts, where damages, legal fees, and costs are
awarded, the Inter-American Commission is somewhat inade-
quate. The primary difference between the Inter-American Court
and the European Court in terms of adequacy of remedies is that,
unlike the Inter-American Court, the European Court does not
provide injunctive relief. Otherwise, both are nearly the same. The
Inter-American Court, however, closely analyzes the quanta of
moral and material damages more often than the European
Court,2 5 and often addresses the awards of damages and legal
costs at a separate hearing, whereas the European Court gener-
ally addresses such awards at the same time that it addresses the
merits of the case.
Another aspect of the adequacy of these international tribu-
nal systems concerns the time it takes for the case to reach its
conclusion. Assuming that the case is found admissible and the
tribunal reaches the merits and damages award stage, the pro-
ceedings can last anywhere from two to ten years, depending on
the case's complexity and the tribunal's interest in a particular
case. The Inter-American system will generally take longer
because of its lack of financial and staff resources and each case's
two-stage process of going through both the Commission and
Court. On the other hand, in addition to having more money and
a larger staff, cases before the European Court do not have to go
through a commission. The Inter-American system however, does
have friendly dispute resolution mechanisms built into it that
expedite the resolution of cases. Unfortunately, the European sys-
24. ECHR, supra note 19, art. 35; MARTiN, supra note 18, at 1058.
25. Compare, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 15
(1994), and Gifleg v. Turkey, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (1998).
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tem no longer appears to have such a strong, friendly dispute reso-
lution mechanism in place, as the old European Commission of
Human Rights was dismantled a few years ago.1
6
1.3 Is THERE AN EMERGING FNC DOCTRINE IN REGIONAL
INTERNATIONAL COURTS?
Although, as previously noted, the FNC doctrine may be moot
for international tribunals, there may be an emerging forum non
conveniens doctrine for these regional tribunals. This issue is
important because different regional and global adjudicative sys-
tems may have jurisdiction over the same case. Recently, the
European Court of Human Rights in Bankovic held that the Euro-
pean Convention's rights guarantees did not extend extraterritori-
ally to areas not under the "effective overall control" of a state
party.27 Bankovic addressed the NATO bombing of the Serbian
radio and television station in Belgrade during the Kosovo Con-
flict. Bankovic is relevant to the FNC doctrine because if the Euro-
pean Court determines that it does not have jurisdiction over
certain extraterritorial state acts, then any overlapping jurisdic-
tion with another regional or global tribunal would defeat an
application of the FNC doctrine. The European Court, as an alter-
native forum, would not be available, and neither would any
advantages associated with using the European Court. However,
this article submits that this "effective overall control" test articu-
lated by the European Court in Bankovic is manifestly incorrect
for several reasons and that, therefore, there may emerge an
international FNC doctrine.
First, the European Court contradicted itself in its decision in
Bankovic. The Court held that ECHR jurisdiction is primarily ter-
ritorial, basing its decision on a general principle of international
law as articulated by international law experts.2 Although the
Court recognized that there are extraterritorial exceptions, such
as flag, nationality, diplomatic and consular relations, it held that
these exceptions did not include jurisdiction over armed attacks
against extraterritorial targets because the jurisdictional lan-
guage in the Geneva Conventions governing such attacks is differ-
26. The European Commission was dismantled one year after Protocol No. 11 to
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Europ. T.S.
No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998), came into force.
27. Bankovic and Others v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., 41 I.L.M.
517, at 70 (2001), available at www.ehcr.coe.int/eng.
28. Id. at 59.
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ent from the jurisdictional language in the ECHR. Article 1 of the
ECHR, governing jurisdiction, states that: "the High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in [the ECHR]."29 Common Article 1
of the Geneva Conventions states: "The High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con-
vention in all circumstances.""
The European Court, however, contradicts itself. The lan-
guage in treaties establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction for
those exceptions that the Court already recognized is often differ-
ent from the jurisdictional language of the ECHR. First, the provi-
sions in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
[UNCLOS]31,which governs jurisdiction over ships on the high
seas, has different jurisdictional language from that of the ECHR,
but the Court recognized that the ECHR applied to ships on the
high seas flying the flag of a state-party to the ECHR 2
Second, the European Court incorrectly rejected the lex
specialis governing jurisdiction established by the customary
international law reflected in Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions [Protocol I], which governs extraterritorial attacks. Instead
of relying on the language in Protocol I, the Court relied upon an
incomplete lex generalis having nothing to do with extraterritorial
attacks. Article 49 (2) of Protocol I states: "The provisions of this
Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks in whatever
territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a
Party to the conflict but under the control of an adverse Party."'
The jurisdictional language of the ECHR says nothing about
29. ECHR, supra note 19, art. 1.
30. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 1, 75 U.N.T.S.
85, at 86 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, at 136
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3516, at 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 at 288
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
31. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, U.N. Doc. At
CONF.62/122 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994)(1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
32. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 31, arts. 86, 92(1), 94(1), and ECHR, supra
note 19, art. 1.
33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, art. 49 (2), 16 I.L.M. 1391, (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter
Geneva Convention-Protocol I].
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extraterritoriality or armed attacks. Because specific law applies
over general law, the Court's failure to follow the language of Pro-
tocol I made its argument invalid. The jurisdictional language of
Protocol I is the lex specialis that should have been used to con-
strue the jurisdictional language of the ECHR.
Third, the Bankovic decision contradicts the substantial case
law of both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
the UN Human Rights Committee that recognizes jurisdiction
over such extraterritorial attacks. For example, the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission in Alejandre et al. v. Cuba and Salas and Others
v. United States, as well as the UN Human Rights Committee in
Saldias de L6pez v. Uruguay and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uru-
guay recognized the extraterritorial application of international
human rights law. 4 It is well-established in international law that
"an international instrument must be interpreted and applied
within the overall framework of the [international] juridical sys-
tem in force at the time of the interpretation."35 The European
Court failed to do this and, instead, invented its own law. The
result will be the emergence of conflicting international legal
norms across both regional and global adjudicative systems, as
well as state confusion over what international legal obligations
will be imposed.
34. See, e.g., Alejandre et al. v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.106 Doc. 3 rev. at 586 (1999) (recognizing jurisdiction over Cuban extraterritorial
use of disproportionate force and violation of right to life); Salas and Others v. United
States, Case 10.573, Report No. 31/93, OEA/Ser.IJV/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. at 312 (1994)
(recognizing jurisdiction over U.S. extraterritorial attacks in Panama); Case 9.239,
United States, 986-87 Annual Report of the IACHR, OEA Ser. L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1,
Sept. 22, 1987, p. 184 (recognizing jurisdiction over U.S. extraterritorial attacks in
Grenada); Saldias de L6pez v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/OP/1
(1985) (views adopted July 29, 1981) (recognizing extraterritorial jurisdiction over
detention and torture in Argentina); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No.
56/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 92 (1984).
35. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16, 31 (1971); Interpretation of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. A, No. 10, at 1 37 (1989); Coard v. United States, Inter-Am.
Cm.H.R., No. 109/99 at 1 40 (1999), available at http'//www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/
99eng/Merits/UnitedStateslO.951.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003); see also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31 (3) (c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (hereinafter Vienna Convention) (treaty must be
interpreted in light of "any rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties"); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (meaning of treaty
language "to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of
nations").
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Fourth, by refusing to recognize extraterritorial jurisdiction
over areas in which a state does not exercise "effective overall con-
trol," it violates other provisions in the ECHR that explicitly rec-
ognize such jurisdiction, such as the right to receive information
"regardless of frontiers.""6 A treaty cannot be interpreted to pro-
duce a result that conflicts with its other provisions. This would
violate the object and purpose of the treaty, which is a violation of
international law.
3 7
Finally, the Bankovic standard of "effective overall control" is
ambiguous. The Court did not explain how much control was nec-
essary, nor did it explain over how much territory the standard
applied. Such a standard is indeterminate.
In conclusion, the Bankovic decision is problematic. However,
it is fair to say that regional systems may be inclined against
extending their jurisdictional competence over matters not within
their regional borders for financial and political purposes. It is
hard to see how this could be a principled conclusion given the
fact that even the European system has recognized jurisdiction
over cases from European territories in the Pacific."' Nevertheless,
lawyers should be aware of this potential issue.
The Bankovic case is important to FNC doctrinal issues. Con-
sider, for example, a case in which a military operation under joint
British and U.S. command kills a civilian in Iraq. The victim's
family might want to sue the U.S. (rather than the U.K., which is
not an OAS member) before the Inter-American Commission
because, unlike the European system, the Inter-American system
does recognize jurisdiction over such extraterritorial attacks.
However, it is unclear whether the Inter-American Commission
would recognize jurisdiction over a killing that took place in Iraq
given the political and financial concerns involved. At present,
this question is unresolved. Furthermore, the Inter-American
Commission cannot award damages against the U.S.
On the other hand, given the aforementioned difficulties with
the Bankovic decision, it may be quite possible that future appli-
cants before the European Court may be able to reverse the
Court's decision in Bankovic. In the above hypothetical, the vic-
36. ECHR, supra note 19, art. 10 (1).
37. Vienna Convention, supra note 35, art. 31 (1) ("A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose").
38. See, e.g., Piermont v. France, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994) (finding French
violation of German national's freedom of expression in French Polynesia); see also
ECHR, supra note 19, art. 63 (extending ECHR jurisdiction to colonies).
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tim's family would sue the U.K. rather than the U.S., which is not
a party to the ECHR, before the European Court. Indeed, this
might be the preferable route for the applicants. Recall that some
states (like the U.S.) do not recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court and, hence, petitioners cannot obtain damages or
legal costs, whereas the European Court does award damages and
legal costs.
In conclusion, the paucity of law on this issue creates uncer-
tainty as to the potential impact of an FNC doctrine on litigation
before international human rights tribunals.
2. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT & THE FNC DOCTRINE IN
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
This section will focus on the FNC doctrine in the context of
human rights claims pressed under the Alien Tort Claims Act
[ATCA]. This portion of the article will only address issues pecu-
liar to human rights cases in the context of the FNC doctrine as
exemplified in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum."
The ATCA states that: "the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.""0 The ATCA was amended by the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act [TVPA] in 1992 to include plaintiffs who are U.S. nation-
als, but only if they have been subjected to torture or extrajudicial
killings by foreign authorities.4
39. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
41. Id.:
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION.
(a) LIABILITY.- An individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation -
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in
an action for wrongful death.
(b) EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.- A court shall decline to hear
a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.- No action shall be maintained
under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after
the cause of action arose.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
110
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In Wiwa,42 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the lower district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'
ATCA claims on FNC grounds. The plaintiffs in Wiwa were suing
Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading under
the ATCA for murder, torture, and other violations of the law of
nations that allegedly took place in Nigeria with the participation
of Nigerian authorities. The lead plaintiff, Ken Saro Wiwa, was a
Nobel Peace Prize winner who was subsequently hanged by the
Nigerian government. The remaining plaintiffs were U.S.
residents. The defendants had sought that the case be tried in an
English court.
The issue of the plaintiffs residence is often raised in FNC
challenges to ATCA suits for several reasons. First, ATCA creates
a private cause of action for aliens only, whose own countries have
(a) EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING.- For the purposes of this Act,
the term 'extrajudicial killing' means a deliberated killing not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term,
however, does not include any such killing that, under
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of
a foreign nation.
(b) TORTURE.- For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term 'torture' means any act, directed against an
individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining
from that individual or a third person information or a
confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, intimidating or coercing that
individual or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.
42. Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88.
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potentially available and adequate fora.43 Second, the alleged
international legal wrong usually takes place in another country
that has potentially available and adequate fora.4"
In Wiwa, the Court of Appeals noted that, although the
proper forum should not be considered solely upon the issue of res-
idence, residence is an important factor for consideration.45 In
human rights cases, such as Wiwa, plaintiffs often have fled the
country where the human rights violations occurred. The ATCA is
an especially appropriate remedy in such a case, particularly if
the defendants are government authorities, because plaintiffs
may very well be subject to retaliation if they return to the coun-
try in which the violation occurred to press their claims. Further-
more, the judicial system of that country may very well be hostile
to the plaintiffs because allegations of human rights violations
could embarrass the government. Hence, under the adequacy of
the alternative forum test in the FNC doctrine, such potential for
governmental retaliation and court hostility would weigh in favor
of the plaintiffs. As the Court of Appeals in Wiwa put it:
One of the difficulties that confront victims of torture under
color of a nation's law is the enormous difficulty of bringing
suits to vindicate such abuses. Most likely, the victims can-
not sue in the place where the torture occurred. Indeed, in
many instances, the victim would be endangered merely by
returning to that place. It is not easy to bring such suits in
the courts of another nation. Courts are often inhospitable.
Such suits are generally time consuming, burdensome, and
difficult to administer. In addition, because they assert out-
rageous conduct on the part of another nation, such suits
may embarrass the government of the nation in whose
courts they are brought.46
Another issue material to human rights cases is that the
plaintiffs often are less wealthy and relatively less powerful than
the defendants that they are suing. Such was the situation in the
43. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 253 F.Supp. 2d 510, 541 (S.D.
N.Y. 2002) (Peruvian courts available and adequate fora for Peruvian plaintiffs
alleging international law violations committed in Peru.).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Alcoa v. Nordic, 654 F.2d 147, 155 (2nd Cir. 1980) (forum non
conveniens should not be conditioned solely upon residence, but "'residence is, of
course, an important factor to be considered"')). "[Pilaintiffs choice of forum is
entitled to substantial deference and should only be disturbed if the factors favoring
the alternative forum are compelling. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508 (1947) ("[A] plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed").
46. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106.
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Wiwa case. Dismissal on FNC grounds requires poor plaintiffs to
start over in the courts of another nation, which will generally, at
a minimum, require the plaintiff to obtain new counsel, perhaps
even a new residence. Furthermore, class actions may not be
available in foreign fora. This too requires greater expenditures
for plaintiffs. Such requirements often impose insurmountable
financial burdens on poor plaintiffs. As the Court of Appeals in
Wiwa stated:
[The] Magistrate Judge, whose findings were adopted by
the district court, gave no consideration to the very sub-
stantial expense and inconvenience (perhaps fatal to the
suit) that would be imposed on the impecunious plaintiffs
by dismissal in favor of a British forum, and the inconve-
nience to the defendants that ultimately justified the dis-
missal seems to us to have been minimal.
47
However, the Court of Appeal's decision in Wiwa has been
criticized because the Court used the TVPA for interpreting
ATCA, even though the plaintiffs did not raise a TVPA claim. The
Court of Appeals held that TVPA expressed a U.S. policy favoring
federal court exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by ATCA in
cases of torture or extrajudicial killings.4 However, one commen-
tator, Aric Short, has argued that this was inappropriate because
the text and legislative intent of ATCA does not disclose such a
U.S. policy.49 Mr. Short, however, repeatedly makes the common
mistake of asserting that the law of nations - violations of which
are actionable under ATCA - did not include such human rights
violations at the time of ATCA's enactment in 1789. He makes the
mistake of equating the law of nations with "international law."
The law of nations in 1789 not only addressed inter-state relations
but also addressed a state's relations with its own nationals,
50
47. Id. at 106-107.
48. Id. at 106.
49. Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non
Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J.INr'L L. & POL. 1001 (2002).
50. One of the Founding Fathers, James Wilson, recognized that the law of
nations governed not only relations between nations but also relations between the
state and its citizens.
Some seem to have thought, that [the law of nations] respects and
regulates the conduct of nations only in their intercourse with each
other. A very important branch of this law - that containing the
duties which a nation owes itself - seems to have escaped their
attention. "The general principle . . . of the law of nations, is
nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges
nations to the same duties as are prescribed to individuals."
See JAMES WILSON, LEcTuREs ON LAW, Of the Law of Nations, 1 1 (1791).
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including the protection of their human rights. For example,
rights to life, personal security, and property as exemplified in the
prohibition against piracy were recognized by the law of nations in
1789.,' International law (jus inter gentes) is only a subset of the
law of nations (jus gentium) 2 Most importantly, jurists in the
eighteenth century recognized that the law of nations was evolv-
ing." After all, that is why the law of nations later became called
"customary international law." Customs often change. For exam-
ple, even if the law of nations recognized the legality of slavery in
the eighteenth century, the subsequent law of nations outlawing
slavery is the correct law to apply, because it would be nonsensi-
cal to apply the outdated law of nations protecting slavery.
Indeed, if Mr. Short were correct, an alien today seeking compen-
sation for the loss of his slaves freed in another country would
have a colorable claim covered by ATCA because the law of
nations protected slavery in 1 7 8 9 .
4 Indeed, one of the first
51. For example, on establishing prize courts, Congress also recognized the
possibility that private Americans may have claims against U.S. authorities and
privateers who seized their cargo in violation of the law of nations. 19 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 315 (prize courts governed by law of nations) and 364
(privateers violating laws of nations subject to forfeiture of commission and "liable to
an action for breach of the condition of [privateer's] bond, [and] responsible to the
party grieved for damages sustained by such malversation") (1912). Piracy - which
includes murder and robbery on the high seas - was prohibited by the law of nations
in 1789. One of the first ATCA cases was for the reparations of property seized
unlawfully on the high seas. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C.1795) (No.
1607) (suit for restitution for loss of slaves under ATCA).
52. The phrase "international law" was first coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1780,
and it referred only to jus inter gentes - "law between nations." JEREMY BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF LEGISLATION, Preface at Part the Seventh (1789).
("Principles of legislation in matters between nation and nation, or, to use a new
though not inexpressive appellation, in matters of international law.")
53. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (distinguishing between
ancient and modern law of nations). The law of nations is mutable and evolving. Only
what Vattel calls the "necessary law of nations" is immutable because of its
identification with natural law. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS OR
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS
AND SOVEREIGN, Preliminaries, at § 8 (1758) ("Since therefore the necessary law of
nations consists in the application of the law of nature to states, - which law is
immutable, as being founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature
of man, - it follows that the Necessary law of nations is immutable." (emphases in
original)) [hereinafter, VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS]; see also J.J. BURLAmAQUI, THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Vol. I, pt. II, ch. VI, § IX (1748) (one kind of law of
nations is "universal, necessary, and self-obligatory ... land] differs in nothing from
the law of nature, and is consequently immutable").
54. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (law of nations protects
slavery); VA-rEL, LAW OF NATIONS, bk. III, ch. viii, § 152 (law of nations allows
enslavement of prisoners of war).
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reported cases that addressed ATCA involved this very issue."
Such an interpretive approach would create the strange situation
of allowing a U.S. court to do that which would otherwise be
unconstitutional if the slavery at issue had existed under U.S.
jurisdiction.56
Furthermore, Mr. Short fails to recognize that federal stat-
utes must be construed in conformity with the United States'
international legal obligations under the Supreme Court's Charm-
ing Betsy Rule.57 Such obligations include the affirmative state
duty to provide an effective and sufficient domestic judicial rem-
edy for human rights violations. International law generally
requires that states provide full reparations, including monetary
damages and, if necessary, injunctive relief when an illegal act
has been committed.58 International human rights law guarantees
that individuals have a remedy enforceable in domestic courts.
For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states:
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative
or other measures, each State Party to the present Cov-
enant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accor-
dance with its constitutional processes and with the
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legis-
lative or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms
as herein recognized are violated shall have an
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the viola-
tion has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by compe-
tent judicial, administrative or legislative authori-
ties, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop
the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
55. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.C.S.C.1795) (No. 1607) (suit for
restitution for loss of slaves available under ATCA).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude...
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
57. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
58. See Chorzow Factory Case, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (recognizing
restitutio in integrum principle).
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enforce such remedies when granted.
5 9
Generally speaking, international law often allows states to
exercise a certain amount of discretion in fashioning how they pro-
vide a domestic remedy for international legal violations. How-
ever, international human rights jurisprudence has strictly
limited this deference and has required a judicial remedy because
other remedies, such as those provided by the political branches,
are most often ineffective and/or inadequate, and a judicial rem-
edy is the only remedy that can provide complete restitution.' For
example, in cases where individuals have committed gross human
rights violations, international human rights law creates an
affirmative state duty to punish such persons.6 1 Only a judicial
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) art. 2 (2)-(3) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The
U.S. is a party to the ICCPR. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY GENERAL: STATUS AS OF DEC. 31, 1992, at 132, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/
11 (1993) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
The American Convention on Human Rights also guarantees an individual a
right to a judicial remedy:
Article 25. RIGHT TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION.
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any
other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for
protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or
by this Convention, even though such violation may have been
committed by persons acting in the course of their official
duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
a. To ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have
his rights determined by the competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the state;
b. To develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
ACHR, supra note 9, art. 25; see FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS 77-78 (2001)
[hereinafter MARTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS] (discussing individual's right to
remedy entails judicial remedy). The U.S. has signed the ACHR, thereby indicating
the U.S.' acceptance of any regional customary international legal norms reflected
therein. See MARTIN, supra note 11.
60. See, e.g., Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 38361/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. at
§ 161 (2002) (states allowed "some discretion" as to how they provide remedy to
individuals for international law violations); M.J. BossUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 67
(1987); Darmburg v. Suriname, Case No. 10.117, Res. No. 19/89, Inter-Am. Cm. H.R.
128, OEA/ser.L/V.II.76, doc. 10 (1988-89); Tumilovich v. Russia, Application No.
47033, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) (domestic remedy depending on discretionary powers do
not constitute effective domestic remedy).
61. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Case No. 4, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at
172 (1988) (state affirmative duty to punish rights to life and humane treatment);
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remedy could provide the required punishment of individuals com-
mitting such human rights violations.
The federal court's discretion to dismiss a human rights case
pursuant to the FNC doctrine is invalidated by the United States'
affirmative duty to provide a forum which will afford a full rem-
edy for human rights violations. Under international human
rights 2 and humanitarian law," this affirmative state duty even
includes providing a remedy for certain gross human rights viola-
tions perpetrated abroad by foreign actors. Because ATCA suits
most often raise claims of such gross human rights violations, the
ATCA in such cases must be construed to eliminate federal court
discretion. Although, generally speaking, international law allows
states to exercise a certain amount of discretion in tailoring their
domestic remedies for complying with their international legal
obligations, international courts have strictly limited this defer-
ence in cases concerning gross human rights violations in order to
ensure a domestic judicial remedy. The rationale behind this rea-
soning is that other remedies, such as those provided by the politi-
cal branches, are most often ineffective and inadequate.
Finally, because human rights violations often are egregious,
U.S. courts have awarded punitive damages in ATCA suits. How-
ever, at least one federal court has held that the unavailability of
punitive damages in an alternative foreign forum does not neces-
sarily bar dismissal of an ATCA suit on FNC grounds. Such rul-
ings are problematic. On the one hand, international human
rights tribunals have not awarded punitive damages against
states per se. On the other hand, international human rights law
does not appear to prohibit the awarding of punitive damages
against either states or individuals. For example, the Statute of
the International Criminal Court provides for a trust fund for the
Celis Laureano v. Peru, U.N. Doe. CCPRIC/56[D/540/1993 (1996) (views adopted
March 25, 1996) (state affirmative duty to punish violations of rights to life, humane
treatment, and liberty and personal security committed by state and non-state
actors).
62. See, e.g., Saldias de L6pez v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
OP/1 (1985) (views adopted July 29, 1981) (recognizing extraterritorial jurisdiction
over detention and torture committed in Argentina by Uruguayan security and
intelligence forces with assistance of Argentinean paramilitary forces).
63. See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 30, arts. 1 ("The High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all Circumstances") and 146 (The High Contracting Parties undertake
to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present
Convention ... ).
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benefit of victims, where all the fines collected by the court are
deposited. 4 Indeed, the international legal doctrine of full restitu-
tion - the principle of restitutio in integrum - suggests that puni-
tive damages may be appropriate in cases where the human rights
violations implicate international crimes. Furthermore, U.S.
courts repeatedly have awarded punitive damages against both
state agents and instrumentalities, as well as private persons
under, respectively, the ATCA and the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act (FSIA)65 Therefore, in determining the adequacy of a
foreign domestic tribunal under the FNC doctrine, the unavaila-
bility of punitive damages in a foreign domestic court should
weigh in favor of the plaintiffs because the ATCA and the FSIA
can provide punitive damages, whereas many foreign courts
cannot.
3. ETHICAL ISSUES IN FNC DOCTRINE WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Finally, there are certain ethical considerations that plaintiff
and defense counsels should be cognizant of in such human rights
cases. Generally speaking, because human rights cases often
involve potential retaliation against plaintiffs by states or other
powerful defendants, plaintiff counsel should be especially sensi-
tive to any client claims of potential retaliation when drafting
their pleadings. Furthermore, defense counsel must communicate
to their clients that such retaliation would be illegal, and, if
64. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 79, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. Article
79 states:
1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly
of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims.
2. The Court may order money and other property collected
through fines or forfeiture to be transferred, by order of the
Court, to the Trust Fund.
3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be
determined by the Assembly of States Parties.
65. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(punitive damages awarded against state actor under ATCA); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886
F. Supp. 162, 198, 201 (D. Mass. 1995) (punitive damages awarded against state actor
under ATCA); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2nd. Cir. 1996) (punitive damages
awarded against private actor under ATCA); 28 U.S.C.A. §1605 (punitive damages
available under FSIA); Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc.,
42 F.Supp.2d 1317 (S.D.Fla.1999) ($137,700,000 in punitive damages awarded
against Cuban Air Force under FSIA); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) ($225 million in punitive damages awarded against Iran under
FSIA).
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defense counsel learns of their client's plans for retaliation, ethics
require that such plans be reported to the court and/or relevant
law enforcement authorities. For example, Rule 4-1.6 (b) of the
Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A lawyer shall
reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary: (1) to prevent a client from committing a
crime; or (2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to
another."" Rule 1.16 (a) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states: "Except as stated in paragraph (c) 67, a lawyer
shall not represent a client or, where representation has com-
menced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1)
the representation will result in violation of the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law."68
Specifically in the context of moving for dismissal on FNC
grounds, defense counsel cannot ethically make an FNC motion
with the knowledge that the plaintiff would face a reasonable risk
of criminal law violations in the foreign forum at the hands of the
defendant if the plaintiff did return to the foreign forum. Even if
the plaintiff was prevented from returning to the foreign forum,
this would be an ethical violation, regardless of the inadequacy of
plaintiff discovery requests. Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohib-
ited by Rule 1.6."
Rule 1.6 states in relevant part:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm;
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. BAR RULE 4-1.6 (1993)
67. Paragraph c states: "(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation."
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2000).
69. Id. R. 4.1.
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(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the law-
yer in a controversy between the lawyer and the cli-
ent, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to alle-
gations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(4) to comply with other law or a court order.7"
Furthermore, the defense may be criminally liable for making
an FNC motion if the defense had knowledge that the plaintiff
would face an actual risk of of gross human rights or humanita-
rian violations by the defendant if the plaintiff returned to the for-
eign forum. Such a motion would be, for defense counsel, the
equivalent of aiding or abetting the commission of certain inter-
national crimes. In Tadic, the Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held the following in
regard to violations of humanitarian law:
[Tihe accused will be found criminally culpable for any con-
duct where it is determined that he knowingly participated
in the commission of an offence that violates international
humanitarian law and his participation directly and sub-
stantially affected the commission of that offence through
supporting the actual commission before, during, or after
the incident. He will also be responsible for all that natu-
rally results from the commission of the act in question.'
Such participation includes words and does not require the defen-
dant's physical presence at the scene of the underlying act. 2
Furthermore, in the Akayesu Case, the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda established a lower liability threshold in
cases of genocide:
[A]n accused is liable as an accomplice to genocide if he
knowingly aided or abetted or instigated one or more per-
sons in the commission of genocide, while knowing that
such a person or persons were committing genocide, even
though the accused himself did not have the specific intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such.73
In conclusion, defense counsel should be very wary of making
70. Id. R. 1.6.
71. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, Trial
Chamber II, 692 (May 7, 1997).
72. Id. at 679.
73. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement,
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FNC motions in order to transfer a human rights case to a forum
where the plaintiff may be exposed to criminal, human rights, or
humanitarian law violations.
CONCLUSION
In litigation before the international human rights courts, the
issue of the applicability of FNC doctrine is a potential obstacle for
petitioners receiving sufficient remedies. Because of the novelty of
the issue, the law is presently unclear as to whether such a doc-
trine, or even some form of it, would be applied and if so, what
should/would be the outcome. This article has outlined some of
the potential contours of the application of such a doctrine and its
consequences. Essential to the future state of the law is the viabil-
ity of the Bankovic case and whether the European Court of
Human Rights' decision in that case will be overturned in the
future by the Court, or else rejected by other international courts.
This article has attempted to show the flaws in the Court's deci-
sion in Bankovic on a number of grounds.
In the area of human rights litigation before U.S. courts, the
FNC doctrine has emerged in the context of ATCA litigation.
Because of the nature of human rights cases in which an alterna-
tive foreign forum may be hostile, plaintiffs may face retaliation,
and poor plaintiffs may face insurmountable financial burdens.
Therefore, defendants probably will face substantial challenges in
successfully arguing for a change of venue on FNC grounds as a
matter of law. It is unclear, however, whether the unavailability
of punitive damages in an alternative forum is a sufficient reason
for denying a change of venue.
Finally, several ethical concerns in FNC motions become
acute in human rights cases because of potential retaliation
against plaintiffs by defendants and hostile states. Lawyers for
both plaintiffs and defendants must be cognizant of such concerns.
Most importantly, defense counsel should be very wary of making
FNC motions because of their exposure to criminal liability.
Trial Chamber I, 545 (Sept. 2, 1998); The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13, Judgement, Trial Chamber I, IT 181-83, 192-93 (Jan. 27, 2000).
